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PRISONERS' RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
During the 1994-1995 survey period, the Tenth Circuit decided several
cases involving prisoners' substantive rights. This Survey features the seven
most significant cases, dividing them into four topical categories. The first
group of cases addresses the controversial freedom of religious exercise under
the First Amendment. This group includes Werner v. McCotter,' the most
influential case of the survey period. Werner offers the Tenth Circuit's first
interpretation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)2 and
its effects on prisoners' rights.' This case may have additional far-reaching
implications because most other circuits have not yet had an opportunity to
interpret RFRA.' The second category of cases involves prisoners' Fourth
Amendment claims of unreasonable searches and seizures. The third group of
cases features the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Lastly, the fourth category addresses a prisoner's Fourteenth
Amendment right of access to the courts.
I. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT5
A. Background
When the United States Supreme Court examines an issue that involves
the constitutional rights of prisoners, the Court relies on a qualified premise:
prisoners retain constitutional protections even while incarcerated. The nature
1. 49 F.3d 1476 (10th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of Werner, see infra notes 29-35 and
accompanying text.
2. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 852 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993)).
3. Congress enacted RFRA to overturn the Supreme Court's ruling in Employment Div.,
Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), a case having nothing to do with
prisoners' rights. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) Now Law of Land, Vol. V., No.
5, CORRECTIONAL L. REP. 65, 67 (1994) [hereinafter RFRA Now Law of Land]. Several senators
and representatives attempted to carve out an exception to RFRA by proposing the Reid Amend-
ment, which would have prohibited RFRA's application to prisoners' free exercise claims. See S.
REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ V(d) and XI (1993); H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993). The Senate defeated the Reid Amendment despite warnings from prison administra-
tors and state Attorneys General that RFRA would open the floodgate for inmate litigation should
the act take effect unamended. See RFRA Now Law of Land, supra, at 67. Congress, therefore,
clearly intended to apply RFRA to prisoners' free exercise claims. For a complete legislative his-
tory of RFRA, see H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-17 (1993); S. REP. No. 111, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-38 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892-1912; 139 CONG. REC.
H2,356-63 (daily ed. May 11, 1993).
4. See Abbott Cooper, Comment, Dam the RFRA at the Prison Gate: The Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act's Impact on Correctional Litigation, 56 MONT. L. REV. 325, 338 & n.81
(1995).
5. The First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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of incarceration, however, justifiably limits those protections.6 The Court pre-
sumes that prison officials can best balance the constitutional rights of prison-
ers against penological interests. Consequently, the Court designed a formula,
known as the Turner test,' which heavily favors the interests of penological
institutions when those interests are in conflict with prisoners' constitutional
protections.9
According to this test, a prison administrator's policy decision that en-
croaches upon a prisoner's constitutional rights is valid as long as it is "rea-
sonably related to [a] legitimate penological interest[]."'" Thus, courts follow-
ing Turner must give considerable deference to the prison administrator's
judgment." Before RFRA's enactment, the Turner test represented the stan-
dard test used for evaluating prisoners' constitutional claims. 2 In effect,
RFRA legislatively overturned the Turner test with regard to religious exercise
cases. 3 In passing RFRA, Congress set forth new criteria for judging govern-
ment encroachments on prisoners' rights to practice their religion. 4
Only those restrictions which place a substantial burden on the practice of
religion trigger evaluation under RFRA. 5 This prerequisite places courts in
6. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
7. Id. at 349.
8. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). After setting forth the doctrine in Turner, the
Court applied it in O'Lone. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349.
9. See RFRA Now Law of Land, supra note 3, at 69.
10. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. The Turner court set out the following factors as relevant in
determining the reasonableness of the regulation: (1) whether or not there is a rational connection
between the prison regulation and the legitimate state interest; (2) whether or not there are alter-
nate means available for the prisoners to exercise their rights; (3) the impact on others of accom-
modating the prisoner's exercise of these rights; and (4) the existence of alternate means of
achieving the regulatory purpose. Id. at 89-90.
11. Id. at 89; see also RFRA Now Law of Land, supra note 3, at 66. The "legitimate inter-
est," or "mere rationality" standard provides the lowest level of scrutiny employed by the Court in
constitutional cases. See Robert W. Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial
Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1049, 1065 (1979) (describing the rationality
standard as the "most minimal of constitutional standards"). The other standards of review which
reappear consistently throughout constitutional law are "intermediate scrutiny" and "strict scruti-
ny." For more commentary on the three standards of review, see 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN
E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTrIONAL LAW § 18.3 (2d ed. 1992).
12. See RFRA Now Law of Land, supra note 3, at 69.
13. Id. at 65-66. Although RFRA changed the government's burden with respect to viola-
tions of religious exercise rights, the Turner test remains the standard for all other constitutional
questions. Id. at 69.
14. Id. at 68. For more information on the effects of RFRA, see The James R. Browning
Symposium for 1994: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 5 (1995). Spe-
cific articles of interest include the following: Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its
Word: The Implications for RFRA and Separation of Powers, supra, at 5; Daniel 0. Conkle, The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional Stat-
ute, supra, at 39; Frederick M. Gedicks, RFRA and the Possibility of Justice, supra, at 95; David
L. Gregory, Religious Harassment in the Workplace: An Analysis of the EEOC's Proposed Guide-
lines, supra, at 119; Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, supra, at 145; Ira C.
Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, su-
pra, at 171; William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Establishment, Equal
Protection and Free Speech Concerns, supra, at 227; Michael S. Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through
It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, supra, at 249.
15. Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995).
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the position of assessing the religious value of the practice in question. 6 The
Tenth Circuit has held that in order to create a "substantial burden":
A government regulation must significantly inhibit or constrain con-
duct or expression that manifests some central tenet of a prisoner's
religious beliefs; must meaningfully curtail a prisoner's ability to
express adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a prisoner reason-
able opportunities to engage in those activities that are fundamental to
a prisoner's religion. 7
Once a prisoner establishes that a correctional regulation substantially
burdens his religious exercise rights, the court will find that regulation invalid
under RFRA, unless the prison administration shows that the regulation both
furthers a compelling state interest, and that the regulation represents the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest.' The Supreme Court describes a
compelling state interest as an interest "of the highest order," one that is "not
otherwise served."' 9 Historically, courts have recognized health, safety, and
security interests as compelling interests in the prison context.2" In compari-
son, legitimate penological interests include interests of a lower order, such as
avoiding inconvenience to administrative personnel, or balancing the allocation
of prison resources.2' If a regulation survives the compelling state interest
analysis, then the government must show there is no less restrictive means of
furthering the interest.22 Because RFRA imposes such a heightened standard
of review, nearly every religious exercise restriction existing today is subject
to legal challenge.23
16. RFRA Now Law of Land, supra note 3, at 66.
17. Werner, 49 F.3d at 1480 (citations omitted).
18. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, § 3(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b)
(Supp. V 1993). The effects of RFRA are so significant because government encroachments on
free exercise rights must now meet the compelling state interest standard, otherwise known as
strict scrutiny, in order to survive judgment. See id. Compare this to the former rationality stan-
dard under the Turner test which required the lowest level of scrutiny in cases involving
prisoners' constitutional rights. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
19. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972); see also Kennedy v. Meacham, 540 F.2d
1057, 1061 (10th Cir. 1976) (noting that where restrictions are placed on the exercise of a reli-
gious belief, "the court should further determine whether any incidental burden on fundamental
First Amendment rights is justified by a compelling state interest").
20. Werner, 49 F.3d at 1479-80.
21. See O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 352-53. The Supreme Court would probably reject administra-
tive inconvenience and cost as compelling state interests in prison cases, since the Court rejected
them as compelling interests years ago in other types of cases. See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250, 263-69 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972); see also
RFRA Now Law of Land, supra note 3, at 72 (commenting on administrative costs and inconve-
nience as a basis for denying a prisoner's religious dietary requests).
22. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, § 3(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)-(b)
(Supp. V 1993). One example of a regulation failing the least restrictive means test comes from a
federal district court which held that a prison could not prohibit the wearing of religious beads
under clothing. The court found that there was a less restrictive means available for furthering the
government security interest of avoiding gang symbols. Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F. Supp. 194,
209 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
23. RFRA Now Law of Land, supra note 3, at 65.
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B. Werner v. McCotter24
1. Facts
A Cherokee Native American, Robert Werner, alleged that the Utah De-
partment of Corrections (UDOC) violated his right to freely exercise Native
American Shamanism.25 Werner claimed that administrators denied him ac-
cess to a sweat lodge, prohibited him from receiving or possessing a medicine
bag and other religious symbols, and failed to provide him with access to a
Cherokee Spiritual Advisor and Cherokee religious literature.26 In defense,
the Utah prison administration argued that the restrictions survived analysis
under the Turner test and moved for summary judgment. 2' The district court
granted summary judgment for the prison administration, and Werner ap-
pealed.28
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that the prison administration's reliance on the
Turner test was erroneous.29 The court invoked RFRA, stating that a prison
system may only substantially burden a prisoner's right to free exercise if the
prison has a compelling state interest, and employs the least restrictive means
necessary to further that interest."° The court held that only those restrictions
placing a "substantial burden" on the practice of religion fall within the ambit
of RFRA." Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions often fail to im-
pose a substantial burden, while the complete prohibition of an important
religious practice would impose a substantial burden.32
In reference to the plaintiff's specific complaints, the Tenth Circuit re-
manded the first claim, noting that Werner had presented credible evidence
indicating that the sweat lodge played a highly significant role in his sincerely
held religious beliefs, therefore presenting a prima facie claim under RFRA.33
The court also remanded Werner's claim concerning the medicine bag, stating
that religious symbols often play a valuable role in the expression of religious
beliefs. The denial of such symbols, the court explained, could create a sub-
stantial burden on religious exercise.3" Regarding Werner's claims concerning
denial of access to a spiritual advisor and religious literature, the Tenth Circuit
affirmed summary judgment, finding the claims devoid of factual support.35
24. 49 F.3d 1476 (10th Cir. 1995).
25. Werner, 49 F.3d at 1478-79.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1479.
28. Id. at 1478.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1480.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1481.
35. Id. The Tenth Circuit found that prison administrators had employed several part-time
chaplains who offered nondenominational religious support to the entire prison population. Id. In
addition, two Native American spiritual advisors were available on a volunteer basis. Id. Werner




Prior to the passage of RFRA, the Supreme Court tended to narrow lower
courts' constructions of inmates' religious rights.36 By following RFRA, the
Tenth Circuit reversed this trend.37 Werner demonstrates the Tenth Circuit's
willingness to accept the new standard of review which RFRA imposes. This
decision also provides lower courts with a clear path to follow in future free
exercise cases.
Although Congress clearly intended RFRA to impose a heightened stan-
dard of review, Congress left the major terms of the statute undefined.38 The
Tenth Circuit relied on pre-RFRA case law to define those terms.39 This reli-
ance demonstrates the court's refusal to abandon pre-RFRA precedent, where
such precedent helps to fill in the gaps that Congress left in the wake of statu-
tory construction.
D. Other Circuits
When the Tenth Circuit decided Werner, few other courts had interpreted
RFRA.' For example, both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have recognized
that prisoners' claims fall within RFRA's language, yet both Circuits have
failed to apply the statute. In Brown-El v. Harris," the Eighth Circuit noted
that prisoners' free exercise claims fell within the ambit of RFRA, yet the
court declined to apply the act. 2 In Bryant v. Gomez,43 the Ninth Circuit
generally acknowledged that prisoners' claims fall within RFRA's broad lan-
guage." The court, however, did not apply the statute, finding that the regu-
lation at issue did not impose a "substantial burden" on the prisoner's exercise
of his religion.43
In Abdur-Rahman v. Michigan Department of Corrections,' the Sixth
Circuit held that the prison's refusal to allow the plaintiff time off from work
in order to attend religious services did not infringe on the prisoner's free
exercise rights.47 The court cited Werner and applied the substantial burden
also refused to accept a donated hawk feather and literature on Native American beliefs. Id. The
court found that Werner himself thwarted all of the correctional department's efforts to accommo-
date his desire to pursue a Native American faith. Id.
36. RFRA Now Law of Land, supra note 3, at 65.
37. Id.
38. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to 2000bb-4
(Supp. V 1993).
39. See Werner v. McCotter, 48 F.3d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995) (defining "substantial
burden" by relying on language in a pre-RFRA Supreme Court decision).
40. See Cooper, supra note 4, at 338 n.81.
41. 26 F.3d 68 (8th Cir. 1994).
42. Brown-El, 26 F.3d at 69. The court noted that although RFRA applied retroactively, the
act was inapplicable as the plaintiff failed to raise the issue. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that
either way, the regulation did not infringe on Brown-El's religious freedom. Id.
43. 46 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1995).
44. Bryant, 46 F.3d at 949.
45. Id.
46. 65 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 1995) (affirming denial of injunctive and monetary relief for the
prison's refusal to allow time off to attend religious services).
47. Abdul-Rahman, 65 F.3d at 491.
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test.' Werner may have been the first case to invalidate a penal regulation
under RFRA's standards.
II. UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 49
A. Background
Courts generally recognize that a prisoner's constitutional right to privacy
is diminished during his incarceration." In Hudson v. Palmer,5 the Supreme
Court held that a prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy with re-
spect to his room or cell.5 2 In the same vein, strip searches and visual body
cavity searches do not create per se violations of prisoners' Fourth
Amendment rights, despite a lack of probable cause on the part of the perfor-
ming official.5 3 The Court has rejected a precise definition of "reasonable-
ness" for Fourth Amendment purposes, and has instead opted for a case by
case balancing test approach. 4 According to the test set forth in Bell v. Wolf-
ish,5 5 a court must strike a balance between the "need for the particular
search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails."5 6 In
striking this balance, a court must also consider the facts and circumstances of
each case.57
In 1989, the Tenth Circuit held that a prison system has a legitimate
penological interest in extracting a prisoner's blood for AIDS testing, while a
prisoner has only a slight expectation of privacy regarding his blood.5" In a
1994 case, Lucero v. Gunter (Lucero I), the Tenth Circuit held that correction-
al facilities could require inmates to provide urine samples for drug analysis,
48. Id. at 492.
49. The Fourth Amendment provides, "The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
50. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Ross A. Epstein, Note, Urinalysis Test-
ing in Correctional Facilities, 67 B.U. L. REv. 475, 480 (1987).
51. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
52. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 530. The Court, however, noted that a prisoner may have an Eighth
Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim when officials perform particularly egregious cell
searches. Id. Prisoners may also have a common law tort claim if officials destroy property during
a search. Id.
53. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979). The Court implied, however, that the
Fourth Amendment may proscribe such a search if conducted in an abusive fashion. Id. at 560.
For further discussion of body cavity searches, see Tracy McMath, Comment, Do Prison Inmates
Retain Any Fourth Amendment Protection from Body Cavity Searches?, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 739
(1987).
54. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
55. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
56. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
57. Id. (stating that "[c]ourts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner
in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place where it is conducted").
58. See Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1194-96 (10th Cir. 1989). In Dunn, the Tenth Circuit
used the Turner test to balance the intrusiveness of a blood test against the prison's justifications
for administering the test. Id. at 1194. Applying the test, the court found that the prison's regula-
tions rationally related to its justifications and passed constitutional scrutiny. Id. In the course of
its opinion, the court noted that a prisoner had a diminished expectation of privacy and that prison
regulations were entitled to greater deference than those in the outside world. Id.
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so long as the selection process was random. 9 An "insufficiently developed"
record, however, could not prove that the selection process was random, so the
court remanded the case.' In 1995, Lucero once again came before the Tenth
Circuit for a clarification of what constitutes a "random" selection process.
B. Lucero v. Gunter (Lucero 1)62
1. Facts
Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) officials requested that in-
mate Anthony Lucero submit to a urinalysis for drug testing purposes.63
When Lucero refused, the facility forced him to serve ten days in punitive
segregation, and subtracted eighteen days of his good time credit for "disobey-
ing a lawful order." While Lucero conceded that random urine testing was
not violative of the Fourth Amendment, he alleged that officials did not select
him randomly since they had requested his sample during the evening.65
According to prison policy, officials were to randomly select a list of
prisoners for urine testing during the day shift.' The CDOC acknowledged
this policy and admitted that officials requested Lucero's sample during the
evening. The CDOC argued, however, that officials randomly selected Lucero
for testing during the day shift, but were unable to collect the urine during the
day due to the shift manager's work load.67
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reiterated its holding in Lucero I, and further stated that
procedures for selecting inmates for urine testing must be truly random.' The
court defined "random" by explaining that selection procedures must not leave
any discretion in the hands of the selecting official, and that the procedures
must also provide "limiting guidelines."' The Tenth Circuit determined that
the Department's computer-guided selection process was random, especially
since no evidence existed suggesting the selecting official's awareness of the
selected inmate's identity.70
59. Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347, 1349-50 (10th Cir. 1994) (Lucero I).
60. Id. at 1350.
61. Lucero v. Gunter, 52 F.3d 874, 875-76 (10th Cir. 1995) (Lucero 11).
62. 52 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1995) (Lucero II).
63. Lucero H, 52 F.3d at 875.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 876.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 877.
69. "Limiting guidelines" are any guidelines preventing the prison's ability to circumvent the
randomness requirement. See id.
70. Id.
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C. Analysis
Lucero II establishes that random urine collection for drug testing does
not violate the Fourth Amendment because it constitutes a reasonable means
of combatting illegal drug use within prisons.7' Thus, correctional facilities
may sample and test inmates' body fluids when such sampling and testing is
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. 72 The Tenth Circuit's
holding conforms to the Supreme Court's general willingness to defer to pris-
on administrators' judgment when reviewing prison policies designed to pro-
tect internal order and discipline. 73 According to the Tenth Circuit, however,
administrators must make concerted efforts to ensure that officials perform
such testing in a reasonable manner.74
D. Other Circuits
As early as 1984, the Eighth Circuit determined that a urinalysis consti-
tutes a search or seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 7" Two years
later, however, that same court held that prisoners' Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated by random urinalysis testing for drugs.76 The Tenth Circuit
appears to have followed the Eighth Circuit concerning this issue.
In 1992, the Seventh Circuit held that urine tests constitute searches for
Fourth Amendment purposes because such testing is analogous to body cavity
searches and blood testing.77 That Circuit also held, however, that random
selection was unnecessary when prison officials test the entire prison popula-
tion in one testing session on a periodic basis.78 This situation eliminates
some of the problems raised by a system that allows administrators to choose
individual inmates for testing.79 Random selection, therefore, was not an issue
squarely addressed by the Seventh Circuit. No other circuits have had the
opportunity to decide this issue.
71. See id. As in Dunn, the Tenth Circuit used a balancing test to weigh the "significant and
legitimate security interests of the institution against the privacy interests of the prisoner." Lucero
1, 17 F.3d at 1350 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979)). In the spirit of the Turner
test, the court also recognized the need to give prison administrators "wide-ranging deference in
their judgment to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Id.
(quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 547); see also WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.9 (2d ed. Supp. 1995).
72. In other words, the body fluid testing must pass the Turner test; see supra notes 8-14
and accompanying text.
73. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 547; Epstein, supra note 50, at 480; see also Fred Cohen & Kate
King, Note, Drug Testing and Corrections, 23 CRiM. L. BULL. 151, 172 (1987) (concluding that
truly random urinalysis that is not conducted in an abusive fashion will withstand constitutional
challenge).
74. See Lucero 1, 17 F.3d at 1349-50.
75. See McDonell v. Hunter, 746 F.2d 785, 786-87 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the Iowa Department of Corrections from conducting strip searches, car
searches, blood tests, and urinalyses of employees unless the searching officials reasonably suspect
that an employee is smuggling contraband or under the influence of alcohol or a controlled sub-
stance).
76. Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1986).
77. Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 312-13 (7th Cir. 1992).




III. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT °
A. Background
The Supreme Court has not yet created a specific test by which lower
courts may determine whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusu-
al." l The Court maintains, however, that in order to survive Eighth Amend-
ment scrutiny, such "[c]onditions must not involve the wanton and unneces-
sary infliction of pain, nor may they be grossly disproportionate to the severity
of the crime warranting imprisonment."82 Conditions of confinement must not
offend "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society,"83 nor may they result in a serious deprivation of basic human
needs. 4
Since inmates must rely on prison authorities to provide their basic human
needs, a prison official's "deliberate indifference" to any of those needs rises
to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. 5 The Court maintains that
such basic needs include medical care, 6 food, warmth, and exercise.8 7 The
Tenth Circuit's list of basic needs includes additional necessities such as shel-
ter (including adequate space), sanitation, safety, and clothing. Conditions of
confinement that do not by themselves establish constitutional violations may
constitute Eighth Amendment violations if, when considered in combination
with other deprivations, the confinement conditions result in the deprivation of
a basic need.89 The Tenth Circuit explained that "a low cell temperature at
night combined with a failure to issue blankets" may deprive an inmate of the
basic need of warmth.'
A prison official exhibits deliberate indifference to a basic need "if he
knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that
risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it."'" This is a subjective
test requiring actual knowledge of the substantial risk.92 In the following cas-
es the Tenth Circuit refined its definition of what does, and does not, consti-
tute a basic human need.
80. The Eight Amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
81. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981).
82. Id. at 347.
83. Id. at 346.
84. Id. at 346-47.
85. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
302 (1991).
86. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05.
87. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304.
88. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566-67 (10th Cir. 1980).
89. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304.
90. Id.
91. Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1984 (1994).
92. See Leading Cases, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term, 108 HARv. L. REV. 231 (1994).
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B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Housley v. Dodson1
3
a. Facts
Jim Housley, a prisoner at the Custer County Jail in Oklahoma, brought
an action against Department of Health officials for allowing him only thirty
minutes of out-of-cell exercise during a three-month period.94 The district
court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted and Housley appealed."
b. Decision
Although the Tenth Circuit never expressly held that prisoners have a
constitutional fight to exercise, the court stated that a "total denial of exercise
for an extended period of time would constitute cruel and unusual punishment
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment." What constitutes adequate exercise
depends upon the circumstances of each case.97 Relevant factors include the
physical characteristics of the inmate's cell, the jail, the average inmate length
of stay, and the security risk associated with the particular complainant.98 An
inmate's complaint alleging a deprivation of adequate exercise for an extended
period of time is sufficient to state a claim under the Eight Amendment."
The court remanded for further proceedings in accordance with its holding."
2. Adkins v. Rodriguez'0'
a. Facts
Shelly Adkins, a prisoner at the Huerfano County Jail in Colorado, alleged
that a prison deputy sexually harassed her and violated her privacy.'" Ad-
kins claimed that while she was incarcerated, Deputy Rodriguez, a trainee,
made comments to her about her body and about his sexual prowess and con-
quests." 3 Adkins also asserted that Deputy Rodriguez entered her cell one
night while she was sleeping, and upon discovering she had awakened, told
Adkins she had "nice breasts."'' "° Deputy Rodriguez resigned soon after the
incident. 5 Finding no clearly established right to be free from verbal sexual
harassment, the district court dismissed Adkins's claim."° Without violation
93. 41 F.3d 597 (10th Cir. 1994).
94. Housley, 41 F.3d at 598.
95. Id.




100. Id. at 600.
101. 59 F.3d 1034 (10th Cir. 1995).
102. Adkins, 59 F.3d at 1035.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1036.
105. Id.
106. Id. Although Adkins advocated an analysis of her claim under the First, Third, Fourth,
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of a clearly established right, government employees retain qualified
immunity.7
b. Decision
Initially, the Tenth Circuit determined that Adkins's claim should remain
limited to the confines of the Eighth Amendment, which is the "explicit textu-
al source of constitutional protection in the prison context."'" Since the
court limited the claim to Eighth Amendment parameters, the test for deter-
mining whether Deputy Rodriguez violated Adkins's rights involved two con-
siderations. The court never determined whether the right to be free from
sexual harassment in prison exists at all."°9 Instead, the court examined
whether the alleged deprivation was "objectively, sufficiently serious," and
whether the prison official acted with "deliberate indifference to inmate health
or safety."''o
The court admitted that the deputy's conduct was "unacceptable and
outrageous." ' The court refused, however, to acknowledge the harassment
as the "sort of violence or threat[] of violence" that violates the Eighth Amen-
dment." '2 Adkins's allegations did not establish that the single invasion of
her cell constituted conduct rising to the level of deliberate indifference."3
Moreover, Adkins did not prove that Deputy Rodriguez knew that she "face[d]
a substantial risk of serious harm and disregard[ed] that risk by failing to take




3. Brown v. Zavaras"5
a. Facts
Josephine (formerly Joseph) Brown, an inmate at the Limon Correctional
Facility in Colorado, filed a complaint against two correctional officials alleg-
ing cruel and unusual punishment for withholding medical care in deliberate
indifference to her basic medical needs."6 Brown, a transsexual, claimed that
transsexuality is a medical condition termed "gender dysphoria.""'7 She fur-
ther alleged that gender dysphoria is a medically recognized psychological
disorder resulting from the "disjunction between sexual identity and sexual
organs.""'  Brown claimed that prison officials failed to provide her with
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the district court confined her claim to analysis
under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
107. Id. For a discussion of qualified immunity in the prison setting, see Matthew P. Previn,
Procedural Means of Enforcement Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 83 GEO. L.J. 1498 (1995).
108. Adkins, 59 F.3d at 1037 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
109. Id. at 1036-37.
110. Id. at 1037 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1038.
114. Id. at 1037 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct 1970, 1984 (1991)).
115. 63 F.3d 967 (10th Cir. 1995).
116. Brown, 63 F.3d at 969.
117. Id. at 968-69.
118. Id. at 969 (citations omitted). For more information on transsexualism and penological
1996]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
estrogen hormones and other medical care available to treat gender dyspho-
ria."9 The district court dismissed the claim and Brown appealed.'
b. Decision
Referring to an earlier decision, the Tenth Circuit noted that when the
provision of estrogen is medically controversial, prison administrators are not
legally required to administer estrogen, nor provide any other particular treat-
ment. '2 Nonetheless, the court maintained that prison officials must provide
treatment to address the "medical needs" of transsexual prisoners.'22 The
court concluded that Brown claimed a medical condition, and, therefore, also
claimed a general right to medical treatment for that condition in her com-
plaint.'23 Although prison officials have no duty to administer estrogen as a
particular treatment, the court remanded the case to determine whether the
Limon facility was providing Brown with the appropriate medical care neces-
sary for her condition.'24
C. Analysis
In Housley, the Tenth Circuit followed the Supreme Court's lead, ac-
knowledging exercise as one of the basic human rights officials may not deny
inmates."2  The court, however, did not hold that any deprivation of exercise
would automatically rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. In-
stead, the court required a totality of circumstances analysis and a determina-
tion of what constituted adequate exercise on a case by case basis.
In Adkins, the court firmly stated that allegations of verbal sexual harass-
ment of inmates by prison officials are limited to an Eighth Amendment anal-
ysis. The court relied on the Supreme Court's holding that both the treatment
which a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions of his confinement are
subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. The court failed to explain,
however, how this language confined the plaintiff's claim exclusively to the
Eighth Amendment.'26 The Tenth Circuit also declined to explain why
concerns, see Ruth Colker, BI: Race, Sexual Orientation, Gender, and Disability, 56 OHIO ST. L.J.
1 (1995); Connie Mayer, Survey of Case Law Establishing Constitutional Minima for the Provi-
sion of Mental Health Services to Psychiatrically Involved Inmates, 15 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
Civ. CONFINEMENT 243 (1990); Edward S. David, Comment, The Law and Transsexualism: A
Faltering Response to a Conceptual Dilemma, 7 CONN. L. REv. 288 (1975).
119. Brown, 63 F.3d at 969.
120. Id. at 968.
121. Id. at 970 (citing Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 962-63 (10th Cir. 1986)).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. Although the Tenth Circuit consistently referred to the necessity for treatment of
"medical needs," it declined to address what separated a medical need from a nonmedical one. Id.
125. Housley v. Dodson, 41 F.3d 597, 599 (10th Cir. 1994).
126. The Tenth Circuit relied on language from Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), a
Fourth Amendment search and seizure case, to justify limiting Adkins's claim to the Eighth
Amendment. See Adkins v. Rodriquez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1037 (10th Cir. 1995). Nowhere in Graham,
however, does the Supreme Court state that the Eighth Amendment is the sole source of constitu-
tional protection in the prison context, or that courts may scrutinize government action using only
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prisoners appear to have privacy rights in some contexts, such as the Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches, and not in the Adkins
context. 1 27
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit never explained how a policy of allowing
prison guards to verbally sexually harass prisoners with no threat of legal
liability comports with "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society."'28 Nor did the court explore the possibility that need-
lessly confining an inmate to a psychologically destructive environment may
be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprison-
ment.12 1 Since the Tenth Circuit found no clearly established right in the Ad-
kins claim, it evidently did not recognize verbal sexual harassment as violating
a basic human need.
The Tenth Circuit appears to have set the trend on the estrogen issue.
After the Tenth Circuit held that transsexuals do not necessarily have a right
to receive estrogen, several other circuits held likewise. 3 ° Brown comports
with the decisions of Housley and Adkins; the Tenth Circuit defers to prison
administrations concerning policy decisions, and only interferes with those
decisions in the event of a clear constitutional violation. The court also seems
devoted to a narrow definition of "basic human needs" for purposes of Eighth
Amendment analyses.
D. Other Circuits
Other circuits have also adopted a narrow definition of "basic needs." The
Eleventh Circuit has held that if an inmate receives adequate food, clothing,
and sanitation, then the conditions of confinement do not, on their face, violate
the Eighth Amendment. 3' The Seventh Circuit states that inmates cannot ex-
pect the "amenities, conveniences, and services of a good hotel."'' It also
held that an inmate was not subjected to cruel and unusual punishment during
his twenty-eight days in a segregation unit when prison officials offered to
one provision of the Constitution. In fact, the Court identifies the Eighth Amendment as one of
the "primary sources of constitutional protection against physically abusive governmental
conduct." Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. In Adkins, however, there was no claim of physically abusive
conduct. Adkins, 59 F.3d at 1034.
127. The Tenth Circuit noted that Adkins did not allege that the "violation of her right of
privacy arose out of an unreasonable search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment," or that she
was "denied substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when she was sexually ha-
rassed." Adkins, 59 F.3d at 1037 n.4. The Supreme Court, however, has used substantive due pro-
cess to identify a right of privacy in some cases. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-55
(1973). What the Tenth Circuit failed to acknowledge was that the Supreme Court has also recog-
nized that the right of privacy exists in the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). Curiously,
these are the very amendments Adkins invoked in her claim. See Adkins, 59 F.3d at 1037. The
Tenth Circuit, however, never mentioned that Adkins probably attempted to invoke a substantive
due process claim under the penumbra analysis.
128. See discussion supra text accompanying note 83.
129. See discussion supra text accompanying note 82.
130. See discussion supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
131. See Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420, 1429 (11 th Cir. 1987).
132. Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988).
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transfer him into the general prison population where he could exercise.1
3
Exercise deprivation may rise, however, to an Eighth Amendment violation
where "movement is denied and muscles are allowed to atrophy, and the
health of the individual is threatened.'
34
The Sixth Circuit agreed with the Tenth Circuit's "totality of circumstanc-
es" approach to examining deprivation of exercise actions. However, the Sixth
Circuit refused to specify any minimum amount of exercise as a constitutional
requirement.'35 The Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits generally concur with
the Tenth Circuit's views on right to exercise.'36 The Ninth Circuit, however,
has gone so far as to hold that the deprivation of outdoor exercise could con-
stitute cruel and unusual punishment.'37
Regarding the Adkins issue, the Sixth Circuit generally agrees with the
Tenth Circuit, concluding that an alleged verbal abuse or harassment by prison
officials toward an inmate does not necessarily qualify as punishment within
the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.'38 The Ninth Circuit, however, did
not limit the harassment inquiry to an Eighth Amendment analysis. Instead,
the court recognized that "incarcerated prisoners retain a limited right to bodi-
ly privacy,""' and subjected a policy that impinged on inmates' right to pri-
vacy to the Turner test."4' The Ninth Circuit has also held that inappropriate
body searches may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. 4'
Turning to Brown, other circuits have also refused to find a transsexual's
inherent medical right to receive estrogen. The Seventh Circuit mandated that
federal courts should defer to the informed judgment of prison officials to de-
termine the appropriate form of medical treatment for gender dysphoria.42
133. Id. at 1236. The plaintiff in this case was in temporary segregation for his own protec-
tion. Officials offered him the option of either foregoing his exercise rights or accepting a transfer
to the general population where he could exercise. The court noted that, even in his segregation
unit, the plaintiff could have "improvised temporarily" with jogging in place, aerobics, or pushups.
Id.
134. Id.
135. See Rodgers v. Jabe, 43 F.3d 1082, 1087 (6th Cir. 1995).
136. See, e.g., Leonard v. Norris, 797 F.2d 683, 685 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that a punitive
measure depriving an inmate of out-of-cell exercise for fifteen days is not violative of the Eighth
Amendment); Anderson v. Coughlin, 757 F.2d 33, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that one hour of
outdoor exercise per 24-hour period for prisoners in "special housing units" did not violate the
Eighth Amendment); Wilkerson v. Maggio, 703 F.2d 909, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding no
Eighth Amendment violation where prison officials allowed an inmate one hour of daily indoor
exercise, although the officials did not allow the inmate to exercise outdoors for a period of five
years).
137. Allen v. Sakai, 40 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1695 (1995).
138. See Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 955-56 (6th Cir. 1987).
139. Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1988).
140. Id. In this case, inmates alleged that prison officials were violating their privacy rights by
performing routine strip searches where female correctional officers and visitors could view them.
The court acknowledged that "[allthough the inmates' right to privacy must yield to the penal
institution's need to maintain security, it does not vanish altogether." Id. at 334 (quoting Cumbrey
v. Meachum, 684 F.2d 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1982)). Nonetheless, the court found that the position-
ing of female guards, that resulted in only infrequent observation, was reasonably related to legiti-
mate penological interests and was not so degrading as to warrant court interference. Id.
141. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1526 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a prison policy
requiring male guards to conduct suspicionless clothed body searches on female prisoners inflicted
"pain" for Eighth Amendment purposes, where many female inmates were victims of prior sexual
abuse).
142. Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 414 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987);
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The Eighth Circuit conceded that transsexualism is a very complex medical
and psychological problem, and that experts disagree on the proper treatment
for the problem.'43
IV. RIGHT OF ACCESS TO THE COURTS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT'"
A. Background
The Fourteenth Amendment entitles inmates to "adequate, effective, and
meaningful" access to the courts. 45 In other words, states must provide in-
mates with a reasonable opportunity to present constitutional claims.'" The
right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in
preparing and filing legal papers, either by providing inmates with adequate
law libraries or with assistance from persons trained in the law.'47 The Sup-
reme Court has also recognized that communications between an inmate and
his legal counsel can constitute a valuable element of the right of access to the
courts.'"
While acknowledging the Supreme Court's determination that inmates
have a right to court access, the Tenth Circuit has noted that the Court did not
hold that inmates have "an absolute right to any particular type of legal assis-
tance."' 49 In addition, the Tenth Circuit does not require states to provide
unlimited access to assistance.' In evaluating restrictions on legal access,
courts "must consider the regulations, facilities, and available resources togeth-
er as a whole, remembering that 'meaningful access' is the touchstone of this
constitutional guarantee."'' In the following two cases, the Tenth Circuit
discusses what types of limitations on legal access remain constitutional.
see Mayer, supra note 118, at 248.
143. White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1988).
144. The Fourteenth Amendment does not explicitly create the right of access to the courts.
The Supreme Court has found the right implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause which provides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
145. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977).
146. Id. at 825.
147. Id. at 828. Bounds does not require prison administrators to provide both as long as
access is "meaningful." See id. at 832. Note that the right of access to the courts is distinct from
the right to assistance of counsel, which is protected under the Sixth Amendment.
148. Id. at 823.
149. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 583 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041
(1981).
150. See Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 357 (10th Cir. 1978).
151. Ramos, 639 F.2d at 583.
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B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Mann v. Reynolds'
a. Facts
Anthony Mann filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself, inmates
confined to death row, and inmates confined in high to maximum security who
were incarcerated in the H-Unit of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary.'53 The
inmates claimed that a prison policy prohibiting barrier-free or contact visits
between inmates and legal counsel violated the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel'54 and the Fourteenth Amendment right of access to the courts.'55
The policy also prohibited contact visits between inmates and health profes-
sionals.'56
During pre-trial proceedings, the prison altered its policy and allowed
medical experts and psychologists to interact with inmates while performing
clinical and psychological testing.'57 The prison did not, however, allow the
inmates' attorneys this type of interaction. Attorneys were separated from
their clients by a wire and plexiglas partition, and restricted to communicating
by telephone and passing documents through a two-inch hole.' In addition,
the prison failed to accommodate requests from double-celled inmates for con-
fidential telephone calls to their attorneys."'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit found that access to counsel may be essential to the
guarantee of meaningful access to the courts." The court held that the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments do not always require full and unfettered contact
between an inmate and his counsel. 6' Refusing to acknowledge full contact
as a constitutional right, the court was unwilling to recognize, as a matter of
law, that the effectiveness of an attorney depends upon the strength of her
emotional bond with the client.'62
Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit applied the Turner test to the prison policy
to determine whether the limit on legal access was reasonable.'63 The court
found that the policy prohibiting contact visits with attorneys was not reason-
ably related to any legitimate penological interest. Supporting this conclusion,
152. 46 F.3d 1055 (10th Cir. 1995).
153. Mann, 46 F.3d at 1056.
154. The Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend VI.
155. Mann, 46 F.3d at 1056.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1057.
158. Id.
159. The court found that approximately 89% of the inmates were double-celled. Id.
160. Id. at 1059.
161. Id. at 1060.
162. Id.
163. Id. For a discussion of the Turner test, see supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
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the Tenth Circuit noted that the prison offered no evidence that the restrictions
were related to any legitimate interest, such as security."6 The prison also
failed to offer any rational explanation showing why attorneys had been sin-
gled out for enforcement of the no-contact policy with inmates.'
65
2. Carper v. DeLand'6
a. Facts
Wayne Carper and other inmates at the Utah State Prison filed a class
action suit against the Director of the Utah Department of Corrections
(UDOC). 167 The inmates alleged that the legal services plan at the facility
unconstitutionally restricted their access to the courts by not providing attorney
assistance in general civil matters."6 At one time prior to the suit, the legal
services plan had provided legal assistance to inmates in general civil matters
(such as wills, divorces, workers' compensation, and creditor-debtor disputes),
as well as habeas corpus and civil rights actions."6 However, the Director of
UDOC revised the plan to curtail costs, and in the process retained attorney
assistance only in the filing of papers concerning habeas corpus and conditions
of confinement actions.7 The plan did not include the provision of a legal
library.'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that a state's obligation to ensure prison inmates
access to the courts does not include providing legal services for civil matters
other than habeas corpus or civil rights actions regarding conditions of current
confinement.'72 Although prison officials have no duty to provide legal ac-
cess in general civil matters, the officials may not "erect barriers" to impede
inmates from obtaining legal assistance regarding constitutional
protections."'
164. Mann, 46 F.3d at 1060-61 (noting that a legitimate security concern would rise to the
level of a compelling government interest); see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. The
court, however, rejected prison officials' evidence of "isolated occasions when cigarettes, chewing
gum, pens, and paper clips have been unwittingly passed by uninitiated lawyers to inmates" as
proof of a security risk. Mann, 46 F.3d at 1060.
165. Mann, 46 F.3d at 1060. The court noted suspiciously that officials had allowed unfet-
tered contact with "virtually all those with whom [inmates] interact except their lawyers." Id.
166. 54 F.3d 613 (10th Cir. 1995).
167. Carper, 54 F.3d at 614-15.
168. Id. at 615.
169. Id. at 614.
170. Id. at 615.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 616-17.
173. Id. at 617. The court also stated that an inmate's right of access does not require the
state to supply legal assistance beyond the stage of initial pleadings in a condition of confinement
or habeas corpus action. Id.
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C. Analysis
In Mann, the Tenth Circuit did not expressly hold that a policy prohibiting
physical contact between attorneys and clients violated the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments. An encroachment of rights must exist, however, to trig-
ger the Turner test. 74 Thus, the Mann court's use of the Turner test implies
that inmates have a constitutional right to contact visitation with their attor-
neys. It is reasonable to assume, however, that if a prison presented evidence
of a legitimate penological interest in prohibiting contact visits, the Tenth
Circuit would defer to that interest.'75
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Carper implies that a prison administra-
tor's refusal to provide legal assistance to inmates in general civil matters does
not erect a barrier impeding all rights of access. The court suggested that in-
mates have no right of access to state funded legal assistance in actions such
as divorce, wills and estates, and other general civil matters. Considering the
conservative nature of the current Supreme Court, the Court would likely
support the Tenth Circuit's holding in Carper.
76
D. Other Circuits
In 1973, the Seventh Circuit held that an inmate has the right of unfet-
tered access to the courts, and that all other rights become illusory without
such a right. 77 This Circuit also declared that "effective protection of access
to counsel requires that the traditional privacy of the lawyer-client relationship
be implemented in the prison context.' ' 78 Moreover, the Seventh Circuit re-
quired a prison administration to show evidence of reasonable suspicion of a
security risk in order to justify an impairment of communication between
attorneys and inmates. 7 9
In 1990, the Ninth Circuit held that the right of access to the courts in-
cludes attorney contact visitation.'s" A few years later, however, it found that
174. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
175. Id. The Tenth Circuit would likely defer to penological interests because the Turner test
is inherently highly deferential to administrative interests. One legitimate state interest is enough
to satisfy the test's requirements.
176. This hypothesis is especially convincing when one considers Justice Rehnquist's dissent
in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). In Bounds, Justice Rehnquist asserted that inmates have
no constitutional right to file habeas corpus and conditions of confinement actions in federal court.
Id. at 833 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He stated, "There is nothing in the United States Constitu-
tion which requires that a convict serving a term of imprisonment... pursuant to a final judg-
ment ... have a 'right of access' to the federal courts in order to attack his sentence." Id. at 837.
The Court has grown more politically conservative since the 1970s. See DAVID G. SAVAGE,
TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 3-25 (1992). Thus, it seems
unlikely that a modern majority would vote to broaden the rights acknowledged by the majority in
Bounds.
177. Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 1973). The court found that unless in-
mates receive unhindered access to the courts, all constitutional rights would be "entirely depen-
dent for their existence on the whim or caprice of the prison warden." Id.
178. Id. at 631.
179. Id. at 631-32.
180. Ching v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a policy denying a
prisoner contact visits with his attorney prohibited effective attorney-client communication and
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prohibiting certain inmates from contact visits with attorneys was rationally
related to legitimate penological interests in preventing escape, assault, hostage
taking, and the introduction of contraband, even where there was no history of
such incidents resulting from contact visitation.' This decision effectively
placed the burden on prison inmates to show that the non-contact visitation
policy fails under a Turner analysis.'82
Regarding the Carper issue of extent of access in civil matters, the Sixth
Circuit recently held that a state's obligation to provide inmates with access to
the courts does not extend to civil matters beyond collateral attacks on convic-
tions or challenges to the constitutionality of conditions of confinement.83
The Third Circuit recently held that the right of court access does not include
the right to counsel in civil actions (including habeas corpus proceedings)
because the language of the Sixth Amendment limits the right to counsel to
criminal proceedings.'84 In contrast to the Tenth Circuit's view, the Fifth
Circuit held that a prisoner's reasonable access to the courts "must include
access in general civil matters including, but not limited to, divorce and small
claims."'8 5
CONCLUSION
In general, the Tenth Circuit appears committed to giving deference to
prison administrations concerning correctional policy decisions. The court
seems unlikely to interfere with prison officials' policy making, absent a clear
constitutional violation. Avoiding any broad categorical expansion of inmate
rights, the court carefully follows precedent, and strictly applies legal tests and
definitions. The Tenth Circuit appears to construe inmate rights rather narrow-
ly; however, it also demonstrates a willingness to defer to legislation designed
to expand those rights.
Shann R. Jeffery
abridged the prisoner's right of meaningful access to the courts).
181. Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1520-21 (9th Cir. 1993).
182. See Song Hill, Casey v. Lewis: The Legal Burden Is Raised; The Physical Barrier Is
Spared, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1, 2 (1995) ("The Ninth Circuit requires prisoners to dem-
onstrate the unreasonableness of a prison regulation which infringes upon their constitutional
rights."). The Casey court held that thf encroaching prison policy was reasonable even in the
absence of any history of related security violations. Casey, 4 F.3d at 1521. This seems to require
a prisoner who challenges the policy to show that, without the policy, the occurrence of a security
violation is unlikely or impossible.
183. Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1009 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 973 (1993).
184. Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1453-54 (3d Cir. 1995).
185. Corpus v. Estelle, 551 F.2d 68, 70 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that the Texas Department of
Corrections could not prohibit prisoners from giving or receiving legal assistance with regard to
civil matters); see also Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that the
right of access to the courts extends to civil as well as constitutional claims).
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